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Artículo: Virgin Media versus iTunes, por Natali Helberger

¿Debe o puede obligarse a una empresa a licenciar la tecnología desarrollada por ésta a sus competidores? ¿Se consigue con esta medida promover la competencia y así beneficiar a los consumidores? Cuestiones hoy en día objeto de debate y que en lo personal me fascinan. Pero más que eso me intrigan, porque la interrogante que debe surgir en primer lugar nunca se formula. ¿Las demandas de licencias compulsivas pertenecen al campo del derecho de la libre competencia o sólo son el disfraz de una estrategia para evadir el ámbito de protección que otorga el derecho de la propiedad intelectual?

Sobre este tema encontré un artículo, escrito por Natali Helberger y titulado "Virgin Media versus iTunes. Using competition law as tool to enforce access to DRM … and failing." Del mismo merece ser citado el siguiente extracto.:

"A different question altogether is whether mandating access to a particular DRM standard is the solution to the problem of technical market segmentation as far as DRM is concerned. One aspect that is worth being considered in this context is that enforcing access to a particular DRM standard could further re-enforce the dominance of the FairPlay standard and discourage competitors from designing technically more advanced, and more consumer-friendly solutions. Mandated access regimes can be very questionable from the standpoint of static and dynamic efficiencies and consumer welfare. Access obligations could hamper investment by cutting down incentives to invest in technical innovation and improvement, and by discouraging other enterprises from doing so. As a consequence, mandated access could further strengthen the market position of a particular standard rather than remedying it. "

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